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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2092 
 ___________ 
 
 MARC KEATING, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
PITTSTON CITY; OFFICER TOKAR; OFFICER HUSSEIN 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-00411) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Joel H. Slomsky 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2011 
 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: October 5, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
 Pro se appellant Marc Keating appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and denying him leave to amend.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  For the reasons discussed below, we will 
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. 
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This case arises out of an incident in which several police officers, including 
defendants Officer Tokar and Officer Hussein, allegedly entered the home of Keating’s 
father, searched the home, and handcuffed and strip searched Keating (who was present 
in the house at the time).  Keating has raised the following claims under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983:  (1) that Officers Tokar and Hussein violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 
entering his father’s house; (2) that Officers Tokar and Hussein violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by searching and seizing him1
A magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed under 
§ 1915(e).  Keating filed objections in which he argued that he should be permitted to 
amend his complaint to address the shortcomings the magistrate judge identified and to 
add a claim of trespass under Pennsylvania law.  The District Court approved and 
adopted the report and recommendation, concluding that Keating’s claims lacked merit 
and that amendment would be futile.  Keating then filed a timely notice of appeal. 
; and (3) that defendant the City of 
Pittston failed to train its officers and was thus liable for their misconduct under Monell 
v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 We agree with the District Court that, as pleaded, each of Keating’s claims fails as 
a matter of law.  First, the District Court properly dismissed Keating’s illegal-entry claim.  
As the District Court observed, Keating failed to plead that he was anything more than a 
short-term guest in the home, and he thus lacked standing to assert a Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
1  While this claim seems to concern two separate acts — a search and a 
seizure — Keating treated it as a single claim in his complaint, and the District Court did 
the same in its opinion.  For purposes of this opinion, we will follow suit. 
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claim.  See United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2006).  As to Keating’s 
claim that he was illegally searched and seized, he did not aver that Tokar or Hussein was 
“personally involved” in those incidents, which is required to make out a viable claim 
under § 1983.  See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Finally, Keating has alleged that Pittston City provided inadequate training to its police 
officers in only the most general, conclusory terms; these allegations are insufficient to 
make out a meritorious Monell claim.  See Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 
314, 325 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 However, when a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, a plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to amend the 
complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.  Grayson v. Mayview State 
Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).  The District Court concluded that amendment 
here would be futile.  We review this ruling for abuse of discretion; “if a district court 
concludes that an amendment is futile based upon its erroneous view of the law, it abuses 
its discretion.”  Travelers Indem. Co. v. Dammann & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 238, 243 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (internal alteration, quotation marks omitted). 
We agree with the District Court that it would have been futile for Keating to 
amend his Monell claim; he has given no indication that he can plead anything beyond 
the conclusory statements that he presented in his complaint.  It would also be futile for 
Keating to amend the claims that he has raised against Officers Hussein and Tokar in 
their official capacities, because the Eleventh Amendment bars these claims.  See Hafer 
v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991).  Similarly, while Keating has asked to amend his 
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complaint to include a state-law trespass claim, the District Court correctly concluded 
that such a claim would be barred by Pennsylvania’s Political Subdivision and Tort 
Claims Act.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8550. 
 On the other hand, we conclude that the District Court erred in refusing to permit 
Keating to amend his claim that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 
entering his father’s house.  In response to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that 
the claim be dismissed for lack of standing, Keating sought to amend, alleging that he 
paid for the utilities at his father’s house, had permission to reside there, and slept and 
showered there.  The District Court concluded that the proposed amendments would be 
futile because Keating was not able to plead that he “actually resided” in the home.  
However, the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not limited to people in “their” 
houses; “in some circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
the house of someone else.”  Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); see Minnesota 
v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1990).  Thus, it would not necessarily be futile for Keating 
to amend his complaint to include further allegations concerning his status in the house at 
the time the defendants entered.  See, e.g., Abbott v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 149 (3d Cir. 
1998). 
We likewise conclude that the District Court should have permitted Keating to 
amend his claim that he was illegally searched and seized.  The District Court held that 
the claim failed because Keating had claimed that Officer Coslett, not Officers Tokar or 
Hussein, had been the one to effectuate the search and seizure.  Keating asked to amend 
his complaint to include a claim against Coslett; he also presented additional allegations 
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that suggested that Officer Tokar had, in fact, participated in the alleged seizure.  See 
Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190 (3d Cir. 1995).  The District Court did not 
address whether this amendment would be futile; because the proposed amendment 
appears to cure the deficiency that the Court identified, Keating should also be permitted 
to amend this claim.  See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).  We express 
no opinion as to whether Keating will ultimately plead a colorable claim; we conclude 
only that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint as to these claims.   
 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order insofar as it denied 
Keating’s request to amend his claims that (1) the defendants violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by entering his father’s house, and (2) the defendants violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights by searching and seizing him.  We remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.     
 
